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Adaptable property-rights institutions, we argue, foster economic development. The British example
illustrates this point. Around 1700, Parliament established a forum where rights to land and resources
could be reorganized. This venue enabled landholders and communities to take advantage of economic
opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited from the past.
In this essay, historical evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis demonstrate that Parliament
increased the number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to increases in the public's demand
for such acts. This evidence corroborates a cornerstone of our hypothesis.
Gary Richardson
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… laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As 
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new 
truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a 
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain ever 








Economists view secure property rights as necessary for economic development 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; La Porta et al. 2004). This observation initially arose from 
studies of the property-rights system in nineteenth-century Britain (Coase 1960, 1974). The 
British example, some scholars argue, proves that establishing secure property rights is not 
merely a prerequisite, but is in itself sufficient, to trigger modern economic growth (North 1981, 
North and Weingast 1989). This essay offers a new lesson regarding property rights and 
economic progress. Britain’s economic ascent began after Parliament established institutions 
enabling property rights to adapt to changing economic conditions and enabling land and 
resources to be reallocated towards more productive uses. Adaptable property rights, in other 
words, contributed to Britain’s economic development. 
Britain’s medieval property system possessed characteristics common to landholding 
systems in developing nations, past and present. Rights of families and ancestors received 
prominence over the rights of individuals and descendents. A complex spectrum of overlapping 
privileges (common, communal, clerical, feudal, familial, statutory, and royal) enforced by an 
array of courts (manorial, county, clerical, and royal) pertained to most plots of land. These 
                                                 
1   Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816. This quote is inscribed on the south-eastern 
interior wall of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, DC.  
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venues lacked uniform records and a unified framework for determining ownership, transferring 
rights, and adjudicating disputes.  
Britain’s antiquated system posed problems for people trying to reallocate resources 
towards more productive uses, particularly opportunities arising from technologies unanticipated 
in the distant past. Holders of estates could neither mortgage, nor lease, nor sell much of the land 
under their control. Holders under many types of tenures could only transfer property to 
particular persons or members of a local community. Residents often had to keep land in 
traditional uses. Residents could neither utilize resources in new ways, nor improve 
infrastructure, nor repackage rights without reaching agreements with all other parties possessing 
interests in a parcel, and such agreements could not, in most cases, be enforced by law, but 
could, in many instances, be challenged through courts. 
Britain’s medieval property system also inhibited localities from providing public goods, 
particularly those extending beyond the bounds of traditional communities or those necessitated 
by the expansion of commerce and cities. Communities lacked mechanisms for raising revenues 
and powers of eminent domain. Communities struggled to overcome free-riding, which inhibited 
the provision of public goods, and hold-outs, who withheld resources needed for public projects 
unless paid exorbitant sums. Market transactions might have alleviated these inefficiencies, but 
in most cases, the necessary transfers could not be consummated and the requisite contracts 
could not be enforced because of the restrictive nature of the anachronistic rights regime, which 
valued tradition and stability above innovation and flexibility.  
English society struggled to improve the landholding system. In the six centuries 
following the Norman Conquest, the nation reformed landholding laws repeatedly. But, the 
principal problems persisted until the end of the seventeenth century, when Parliament embraced  
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novel ideas concerning property and began processing petitions from groups hoping to 
reorganize rights to land and resources. Parliament reviewed requests from individuals, families, 
and communities, and after considering the interests of all concerned and the general public, 
rewrote rules regarding the use and ownership of property. Parliament enshrined these accords in 
three types of acts: estate, statutory authority, and enclosure. Estate acts altered the rights of 
individuals and families; eliminated restrictions on the uses to which property could be put; 
authorized the sale, mortgage, and leasing of land; and facilitated the enforcement of contracts. 
Acts establishing statutory authorities created new organizations that built, operated, and 
maintained infrastructure and public services. Statutory authorities received new rights, such as 
the authority to collect tolls, levy taxes, issue debt, and purchase land. These rights superseded 
traditional rights, such as burgesses’ right to travel throughout the realm free from tax and toll, 
enshrined for centuries in town charters and the Magna Carta. Enclosure acts disbanded 
collectively-managed common-field villages and assigned to individuals rights to particular 
pieces of property. Enclosure acts also shifted commonly-held agricultural land to new uses, 
such as the construction of housing and workshops near growing towns and cities. Acts of all 
three types embodied the public’s desire to reorganize rights and to reallocate resources towards 
more productive uses. 
This essay shows that individuals and groups – including aristocratic estate holders, 
yeomen holding by custom of the manor, tenants on small plots, urban landlords, rural villages, 
nascent corporations, and growing urban communities – approached Parliament and requested to 
reorganize rights when economic opportunities made it profitable to do so and that Parliament 
accommodated the public’s demands. Parliament favored petitions that left all pertinent parties 
as well (or better) off than under previous arrangements; that engendered little or no opposition;  
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and that enhanced productivity, improved infrastructure, or provided public services. Parliament, 
in other words, functioned as a forum for facilitating agreements among individuals that 
reorganized property rights in ways that enabled resources to be put to more productive uses. 
This forum enabled society to voluntarily and peacefully restructure traditional arrangements in 
response to arising opportunities. This politically-fostered flexibility of property rights was, we 
argue, a key institutional innovation in England in the century preceding industrialization. 
A principal testable implication of our hypothesis concerns the relationship between 
economic conditions and the passage of estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts. If our 
hypothesis is correct, then conditions that increased returns from reorganizing rights – for 
example, economic booms that increased returns to investing in infrastructure or low interest 
rates that decreased the costs of financing construction – should have encouraged people to 
propose larger numbers of acts. Conditions that lowered returns from reorganizing rights should 
have reduced the number of proposals. In turn, if our hypothesis is correct, Parliament should 
have responded to increases (or decreases) in the public’s demand for acts by increasing (or 
decreasing) the number of acts that it passed. 
This essay tests these implications with new data on the number of acts that reorganized 
property rights and new methods designed to exploit that information to the fullest possible 
extent. Our methods begin with simple assumptions about the way in which Parliament and the 
political process operated, or in other words, the processes through which people proposed and 
Parliament passed acts. These assumptions yield a simple, structural model of the Parliamentary 
process, which in turn, yields a series of reduced-form equations that can be estimated to identify 
whether Parliament responded to changes in the public’s demand for estate, enclosure, and 
statutory-authority acts. Mathematical propositions link the reduced-form and structural  
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equations, illuminating the logical way to interpret our estimates. These methods enable us to 
account for econometric issues – such as the non-stationarity and heterogeneity of the statistical 
series – that complicate the process of drawing inferences from the data. These methods also 
enable us to eliminate plausible alternative explanations for the patterns apparent in the evidence, 
and thus, to draw causal conclusions from the correlations in the data. 
The rest of this essay carries out this endeavor. The second section reviews the literature 
that sets the stage for our analysis. The third section describes the archival data that we employ 
and the new times series that we analyze. The fourth section introduces our mathematical model 
and statistical methods. The fifth section describes our empirical results. The concluding section 
discusses how Britain’s gradual, consensual, and voluntary adoption of modern property rights 
facilitated economic expansion in the century preceding the Industrial Revolution and whether 
adaptable property-rights institutions can foster development in the world today. 
 
1: Literature Review 
Scholars have long studied the connection between politics, property rights, and 
prosperity in early-modern Britain. In The Wealth of Nations, for example, Adam Smith writes 
that “commerce could not flourish if people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of 
their property.”
2 Douglas North and Barry Weingast (1989) emphasize the role of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, which they argue, created a constitutional consensus that prevented royal 
governments from expropriating citizens’ property. Security of property rights encouraged 
investment and innovation, initiating Britain’s industrial expansion. 
Historians debate the accuracy of North and Weingast’s interpretation of the Glorious 
Revolution. Critics include Gregory Clark and Patrick O’Brien. Clark (1996) argues that secure 
                                                 
2   Smith 1976, p. 910  
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property rights existed far into the English past. Expropriation occurred only in exceptional 
circumstances, such as when individuals rebelled against the regime. O’Brien (1994) argues that 
the Glorious Revolution weakened property rights. After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament 
raised taxes, embarked on foreign wars, and regulated a wide-array of industries. Alternative 
interpretations of Parliament’s impact on the economy abound. Paul Langford (1991) stresses 
Parliament’s active involvement in local legislation and argues that after 1688 propertied 
Englishman used their control of the political system to enact changes in property rights 
arrangements which benefited themselves as well as the larger economy. Julian Hoppit (1996, 
1997) finds that the success rate for personal, communications, and enclosure acts increased 
significantly in the early eighteenth century, and argues that Parliament had a capacity to meet 
private or local demands for legislation. Hoppit’s work documents the rapid expansion of 
Parliamentary activity after the Glorious Revolution and builds upon a venerable tradition of 
categorizing and counting acts. Examples include Tate (1967 and 1978), Turner (1980 and 
1984), Innes (1997), and Wordie (1983). 
We build upon this foundation by counting annual numbers of acts that altered property 
rights between 1700 and 1830. We compare this count to economic and political variables that 
influenced the benefits and costs of reorganizing rights to land. The spirit of this exercise 
resembles the work of N.F.R. Crafts (1977) and Clark (2001). Both authors discuss the 
correlation between the number of enclosure acts, wheat prices, and interest rates.  
This essay extends that line of reasoning in several ways. First, it examines all types of 
acts that altered property rights arrangements, rather than one type among many. Second, this 
essay deals with crucial issues of statistical inference and identification. Its statistical methods 
ensure that correlations between property rights and economic incentives arise for real reasons,  
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rather than statistical phenomena that frequently generate spurious correlations between time-
series variables that trend across time. Third, this essay derives its statistical tests from 
straightforward economic models that reveal how to appropriately interpret the estimates. Fourth, 
this essay examines both treatment and control groups. The control groups consist of acts that 
were processed using the same procedures as estate, enclosure, and statutory authority acts and 
that performed tasks similar to those acts, but which did not alter property rights. Overall, this 
essay’s statistical methods yield robust conclusions about the nature, causes, and consequences 
of Parliament’s behavior. 
This essay extends the law and economics literature by emphasizing the importance of 
adaptable property-rights institutions. Previous scholars emphasized the security of rights, which 
historians believe existed long before the seventeenth century. We emphasize features of the 
English political and legal system that arose after the Glorious Revolution at the end of the 
seventeenth century. These novel features enabled Parliament to reform property rights on a 
voluntary, gradual, and piecemeal basis. The Parliamentary forum that undertook this task 
possessed no historical precedent. 
 
2. Acts that Reorganized Rights to Land and Resources 
This section describes estate, statutory authority, and enclosures acts, which comprised 
over half of all legislation passed between 1688 and 1830. These acts possessed common themes. 
All affected individuals’ and organizations’ rights. Some created new rights. Others altered or 
annulled old rights. Some created new organizations, such as turnpike trusts. Others disbanded 
existing organizations, including ancient entities, such as village councils and manorial courts. 
 
2.1 Estates  acts  
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Estate acts enabled holders of property to take some action prohibited by the rules under 
which they had inherited their land. Estate acts were necessary because the inheritance system 
limited estate holder’s power over their property, largely in an effort to adhere to the wishes of 
the deceased (who bequeathed the property to their descendents as long as the latter fulfilled 
conditions set out in the settlement), to protect the interests of dependents and heirs, and to 
preserve a family’s estate for future generations (English and Saville, 1983, pp. 19-21). This 
system of inheritance, known as strict settlement, solidified during the seventeenth century and 
prevailed until the nineteenth century. A settlement was a generic name for a property 
transaction and for the documents created in its consummation. While estimates vary, at the 
peak, at least one-quarter and as much as three-fourths of land in England was held through strict 
settlements (English and Saville, 1983, pp. 11-12, 30; Habakkuk 1994). 
Three features of settlements generated a need for Parliamentary involvement. First, 
without an act of Parliament, holders of settled estates could only change the terms of the 
settlement when their heir came of age (i.e. reached the age of 21). Then, the holder and heir 
(typically father and son) could join forces and amend the settlement via the process of common 
recovery. Limited life spans meant that settlements could be changed only infrequently. A family 
might wait decades (or generations) for an heir to come of age and for the holder and heir to 
reach an agreement about restructuring the estate. 
Second, settlements restricted the uses to which land could be put. The reason for these 
restrictions was protecting the rights of dependents and future heirs. Holders of a settled estate 
(who were just life tenants) could grant neither leases lasting beyond their lives nor leases from 
which they benefited at the expense of their heirs (such as leases in which tenants paid lump 
sums up front in return for concessions). Holders could seldom sell, swap, or mortgage property  
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under their control. Holders could not alter property, even if they considered the alterations to be 
an improvement, without risking legal suits. The removal of trees, hedges, and buildings; the 
mining of minerals, quarries, and peat bogs; and the conversion of arable lands into pasture (or 
vice versa) could be considered waste, since these actions converted permanent resources into 
current income. All those who benefited from such actions could be liable for damages if 
dependents or heirs claimed to be harmed. Courts allowed sales, exchanges, mortgages, 
improvements, and long-term leases only if the settlement contained specific clauses authorizing 
such actions. Settlements written in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries seldom 
provided such powers, although as the eighteenth century progressed and as the law concerning 
settlements became increasingly sophisticated, settlements tended to provide broader powers. 
Three, conducting transactions and enforcing contracts on settled land could be costly, 
uncertain, and insecure. Settlements were long, complex documents, often unpunctuated and 
repetitious.
3 Interpreting settlements required experience, skill, detailed knowledge of the 
document, and a large library of property laws, precedents, and legal texts estimated at 674 
volumes in 1826 (English and Saville, 1983, p. 18). Settlements were not part of the public 
record. Copies of the deeds were usually held by the settlers, trustees, and lawyers. Settlements 
had to be consulted before taking out mortgages, drawing up leases, or completing sales, because 
if the settlement did not specifically authorize a transaction, the transaction could be voided. 
Ambiguities in settlements often deterred individuals from acting for fear that the transactions 
would be disputed. 
  Estate acts solved these problems. Estate acts facilitated the enforcement of contracts by 
clarifying permissible transactions and the rights of pertinent parties. Estate acts authorized 
                                                 
3   The fact that until the Conveyancing Act of 1881, solicitors were paid for conveyances by the word (1s for every 
72 words in 1862), did not encourage conciseness (England and Seville, 1983, p. 18).   
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actions previously prohibited by settlements such as the mortgaging of property, cutting of old-
growth timber, and mining of ores and minerals. Estate acts authorized the sale and leasing of 
land. The authorization of sales and leases may have been one of the most significant effects of 
estate acts, since large tracts of English land became exposed to competitive pressures provided 
by the marketplace, and began to be used in a more productive manner.  
 
2.2 Statutory Authority Acts 
Statutory authority acts fostered the construction, improvement, and maintenance of 
infrastructure and social services. Statutory acts focused on particular topics. Transportation acts 
promoted roads, bridges, river navigation, ports, canals, and railways. Urban improvement acts 
provided for street paving, gas lighting, garbage collection, sewage extraction, water provision, 
and police protection. Government building acts fostered the construction of prisons, 
courthouses, and county administrative offices. Poor relief acts provided assistance for the poor 
and encouraged the construction of workhouses. Court of small request acts established legal 
forums for adjudicating credit contracts valued at less than 40 shillings. Lighthouse acts 
authorized whomever built lighthouses on particular plots of land to collect tolls from all ships 
that passed. 
To accomplish these tasks, statutory authority acts created non-profit organizations and 
enjoined the trustees of these entities to serve the public interest.
4 The trustees tended to be local 
landowners and merchants, who served without remuneration. For canals and railways, however, 
statutory authority acts established for-profit organizations such as joint-stock companies, whose 
directors purchased shares of the organizations and profited from their investments.  
                                                 
4   See Webb and Webb (1963) for a description of the organizations established by statutory authority acts.  
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Statutory authority acts granted rights to these new organizations. One was the right to 
levy user-fees and/or raise revenue through other means. A turnpike act, for example, authorized 
a trust operating a turnpike to levy tolls on road-users and claim labor (or the equivalent in taxes) 
from inhabitants along the road. The tolls marked a significant departure from the existing 
system, in which parishes paid for road improvements with local labor and property taxes, and in 
which individuals possessed the right of free passage, enshrined in medieval town charters and 
confirmed by the Magna Carta. Trustees also received the right to issue debt and equity. The 
bonds were secured by the tolls. If interest payments fell into arrears, bondholders could seize 
the toll revenues. 
Statutory authority acts gave organizations the right to purchase land along a route’s right 
of way and defined procedures for doing so. The act authorized the organization to negotiate 
with landowners. If the parties could not agree on the price for a necessary plot of land, the 
organization could appeal to a body of commissioners who could compel the landowners to sell. 
These procedures provided the legal origin for modern laws concerning eminent domain. 
Statutory authority acts limited the powers of trustees. Turnpike acts, for example, 
defined maximum tolls. In each act, a schedule distinguished different types of traffic and goods, 
and for each group, a maximum permissible toll. Similar schedules regulated the issuance of debt 
and terms of interest. 
Statutory authority acts could be amended by subsequent acts which clarified the rights 
and responsibilities of the organization. Canal acts were often amended in order to add branch 
lines or to increase the authorized capital. Turnpike acts had to be renewed, since they expired 
after 21 years. Renewals often expanded trustees’ authority, by allowing them to manage a larger 
road network or altering the schedule of tolls.  
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2.3 Enclosure Acts 
Enclosure acts reorganized rights to property, usually in open-field agricultural villages. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, approximately one-quarter of the arable land in 
England lay in such villages, where residents shared rights to communal assets, such as water, 
pasture, and woods. Villagers also shared rights in the large open fields, which served as 
common pasture during fallow periods and as cropland during the growing season. The cropland 
was divided among the residents, who possessed the right to grow grain on acre-sized plots 
scattered throughout the fields and intermingled with those of their neighbors. Villagers managed 
these collective assets, such as the open arable fields, through village institutions, including 
customary laws and manorial courts. 
Enclosure acts replaced collective ownership of common resources with individual 
ownership of particular plots of land, and replaced collective management through village 
institutions by individual management of personal estates. An enclosure act appointed a 
commission to implement the terms of the act.
5 The commission employed surveyors to draw a 
map of the village with its open fields and strips, tofts and crofts, waste and pasture, and other 
physical features. The surveyors recorded the holders of rights to all of these assets. At a series 
of public meetings, holders of land (and all other rights in the village) advanced claims as to 
what they should receive under the new arrangements. The commissioners decided on the 
validity of these claims. After they made their decisions, the surveyors created a map of the new 
village, displaying the new features, such as fields, roads, fences, and irrigation channels, and the 
owners of each. 
 
                                                 
5   In 1801, the first General Enclosure Act simplified the administration of enclosure bills by providing guidelines 
for those drafting enclosure bills and parameters for permissible outcomes.  
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2.4  The Process of Passing Acts 
In the 1690s and early 1700s, Parliament standardized procedures for processing estate, 
statutory authority, and enclosure bills. Estate acts began with a petition from an individual or 
family desiring to change the rules regarding their estate. The petitioner hired a lawyer 
specializing in estate law to prepare their paperwork. A Parliamentary committee investigated 
the merits of the petition and issued a report. Petitions deemed beneficial to all interested parties 
were written into bills, read to the public three times, passed through both Houses of Parliament, 
and then sent to the King for royal assent. Public notice ensured that individuals with interests in 
the estate knew about the proposal. Parties could oppose the bill by submitting counter-petitions 
to either house of Parliament. Parliamentary committees considered the contending proposals, 
and then passed one of the bills, modified the original bill to satisfy the opposition, or rejected 
both proposals. The multiple layers for review and numerous opportunities for opposition 
ensured that Parliament considered the interests of all concerned before coming to a decision 
(English and Saville, 1983, p. 50). 
Statutory authority acts began with a petition from a community stating a problem, such 
as insufficient road capacity between two places, and proposing a solution, such as the creation 
of a turnpike between the cities. A Parliamentary committee considered the petition and drafted a 
bill on this issue. The bill was read publicly three times before both houses of Parliament. The 
readings allowed potential opponents to express opinions and propose amendments. Advocates 
and opponents typically hired solicitors to present their cases and promote their interests. Like 
modern-day lobbyists, these solicitors maintained regular contact with members of the 
committees working on these issues.        
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Enclosure acts went through a similar procedure. Parities interested in an enclosure held a 
series of public meetings in their village to discuss the issue, and then drafted a petition signed 
by a sufficient group (typically four-fifths) of individuals possessing rights to the land under 
consideration. Advocates submitted the petition to Parliament, where the bill was read publicly 
three times and considered by both houses. 
Parliament employed similar procedures for many types of acts that did not alter property 
rights arrangements. The procedures for estate acts, for example, were identical to the procedures 
for private acts of all types, including divorces, marriages, naturalizations, and appointments to 
official positions that provided salaries or pensions. 
  
3. Data  
The Parliamentary Archive is the principal repository for historical information on acts of 
Parliament. The Archive maintains a computerized catalogue, Portcullis, which indicates the 
clerical title, calendar year, regal year, and parliamentary session for all acts passed since the 
sixteenth century.
6 Clerks inscribed clerical titles on the exterior of a roll of parchment 
containing the full text of an act when Parliament reviewed the original legislation. The clerical 
title summarized the act, usually in a concise paragraph containing enough information for the 
clerks to identify the act and its principal provisions amidst thousands of similar pieces of 
parchment, without opening the rolls to read the full text. 
An earlier paper explains our process for converting the clerical title of every act of 
Parliament into a vector of variables (Bogart and Richardson, 2007). In this essay, we convert 
those vectors of variables into time series suitable for statistical analysis. Tables 1 through 3 
                                                 
6   http://www.portcullis.parliament.uk. The clerical titles within Portcullis were first published in two nineteenth 
century compilations of Parliamentary legislation, Statutes of the Realm (Great Britain, 1800) and Statutes at 
Large (Great Britain, 1807), which were computerized during the 1990s.  
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describe those series. The top-half of Table 1 describes estate acts. Row (a) refers to the series 
indicating the total number of estate acts passed each year. Column (1) indicates that ALL of 
these acts altered property rights. Column (2) indicates that SOME of these acts also altered 
personal rights. Columns (3) through (6) describe the statistical properties of the series. We refer 
to this as the series in “levels”, since it is based on the raw series indicating the annual number 
(or level) of acts passed. Column (3) indicates the annual average. Column (4) indicates the 
standard deviation. Column (5) indicates the minimum number passed in a single year. Column 
(6) indicates the maximum number. Columns (7) through (10) present the same information for 
the series in differences (i.e. the change in the number of acts passed from year t-1 to year t). 
Row (b) describes a time series indicating the annual number of estate acts that authorized the 
sale of property. Row (c) indicates the annual number of estate acts that authorized the leasing of 
property. Row (d) indicates the annual number of acts that authorized either sales or leases. Our 
analysis emphasizes estate acts authorizing sales and leases because these acts placed land long 
bound by the fetters of the past onto the market, which was (and is) one of the most efficient 
methods for reallocating resources.  
The bottom-half of Table 1 describes data that serve as a comparison (or control) group 
for estate acts. These non-estate private acts dealt with issues of marriage, naturalization, and 
appointments to office. These appear in rows (e) through (g) respectively. The sum of these 
series appears in row (h). Marriage acts permitted individuals to marry and/or divorce in 
contravention of secular and religious statutes. Naturalization acts provided foreign-born 
denizens with the rights of native-born citizens. Office acts appointed individuals to positions in 
the royal household, courts of law, executive agencies, and other positions that provided 
government-funded livings. Important similarities existed between these marriage,  
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naturalization, and office acts (collectively called non-estate private acts) and the estate acts 
examined in the top of the table. When processing all of these acts, Parliament followed common 
procedures. Similarities also existed in the clientele that requested these acts, the demographic 
and social forces that generated demand for these acts, and the political factors that influenced 
the supply of these acts. A key feature, however, distinguishes estate and non-estate private acts. 
The value of estate acts varied with economic conditions that influenced the costs and benefits of 
reorganizing rights to land. The value of marriage, naturalization, and office acts did not. 
The top-half of Table 2 describes statutory authority acts. Row (a) indicates the annual 
number of statutory authority acts passed each year. Row (b) indicates the annual number of acts 
pertaining to transportation, principally roads, canals, harbors, rivers, bridges, and railways. Row 
(c) indicates the annual number of acts pertaining to urban improvements, principally the 
provision of water, sewers, market infrastructure, public buildings, gas lighting, garbage 
collection, church maintenance, courts of small request, poor relief, prison construction, and 
police protection. Column (1) indicates whether these acts reorganized rights to land and 
resources. Column (2) indicates whether these acts facilitated or financed the improvement of 
infrastructure (I) or the provision of public services (S). The definitions of the columns (3) 
through (6) and (8) through (11) are identical to the definitions of the corresponding columns in 
Table 1. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series are stationary, as determined by an 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. While several series are non-stationary in levels, all of the series 
are stationary in differences. 
The bottom-portion of Table 2 describes data that serve as a comparison (or control) 
group for statutory authority acts. We refer to the control group as finance acts. These acts dealt 
with national government expenditure and taxation. Most pertained to excise, customs, and land  
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taxes; the development of economic and military infrastructure; and the provisioning of military 
forces. Like statutory authorities, these acts financed the provision of public goods, and their 
passage through Parliament required balancing local and broader interests. Unlike statutory 
authority acts, however, demand for these acts depended largely on the dictates of foreign affairs, 
and little on the costs and benefits of reorganizing rights. 
Table 3 describes enclosure acts. The last row of the table describes a useful control 
group, amendments to enclosure acts. Amendments serve as an illuminating comparison because 
their passage followed procedures identical to initial enclosure acts, but demand for amendments 
arose primarily after random instances when errors crept into original legislation during the long 
process of passing Parliament. 
The accuracy of the data depicted in Tables 1 through 3 depend upon our ability to 
accurately determine the date on which acts passed. For most of our sample period, a convention 
dated all acts passed by a session of Parliament as if they passed on the opening day of the 
session. This convention lingered from an earlier period when Parliament met infrequently at 
royal request and handled a limited volume of business in a short time period. In the eighteenth 
century, Parliament met annually. Sessions began in the fall, usually in the months of October, 
November, or December; lasted throughout the winter; and adjourned in the spring. 
Complications arose, however, in the winters of 1714-1715, 1751-1752, and 1760-1761, when 
the monarch died, and/or Parliament opened late. In 1714, for example, Queen Anne died. 
George I assumed the throne. His ascension delayed the opening of Parliament until January of 
1715. This parliament adjourned in the spring and another opened on schedule during the next 
fall. So, in the year 1715, the conventional dating method assigned the acts passed in two 
Parliamentary sessions – the winters 1714-15 and 1715-16 – to one calendar year, 1715. We  
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correct for this confusion in two ways. First, we run regressions with the raw data, while 
assigning dummy variables to the years in which Parliament did not meet and the years in which 
Parliament met twice. Second, we drop the period of problematic dating from our sample, and 
run regressions for the years 1763 through 1830, when all acts are precisely dated. The two 
methods yield similar results. 
Table 4 lists the explanatory variables. Rows (a) and (b) refer to two variables, the real 
interest rate and the volume of foreign trade, which influenced the demand for estate, enclosure, 
and statutory authority acts. The real interest rate determined the cost of investment and rate of 
intertemporal exchange, which were principal factors determining the returns from reorganizing 
property rights.
7 The volume of foreign trade was a good measure of aggregate economic 
activity, which was a principal determinant of revenues earned by improving infrastructure and 
reallocating resources towards new and more productive uses. The volume of trade also 
measured the health of the industrial and mercantile sectors relative to the agricultural economy.
8 
Rows (c), (d), and (e) refer to variables that influenced the number of days that 
Parliament sat in session and legislators’ incentives for passing large volumes of local 
legislation. Together, these variables – years when the monarch died, years when a new prime 
minister assumed office, and years when Parliamentary elections occurred – were principal 
factors propelling annual variation in Parliamentary productivity.
9 Additional explanatory 
variables, listed in Rows (f) through (k), include indicators for years when Britain was at war, 
when Britain suffered disease epidemics, and when Britain changed the structure of its land tax 
                                                 
7   Our real interest rate is the nominal interest rate, measured as the yield on long-term government bonds, known 
as 2 ½ % consols from Neal (1990), minus inflation, measured as a three-year moving average of the percentage 
change in Clark’s (2001) consumer price index. 
8   Our measure of the volume of foreign trade, like most scholars, is the sum of the official value of imports plus 
exports (Mitchell, 1988). The official values reflect changes in the quantity of imports and exports weighted by a 
particular set of prices fixed at the outset of the eighteenth century. 
9   We take these variables from histories of England and its government by Holmes (1993), Holmes and Szechi 
(1993), and Evans (2001).  
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system. The set of explanatory variables also includes (g) the land tax rate in shillings per acre, 
(h) an index of climatic conditions, based on tree ring measurements, which reflects exogenous 
factors effecting agricultural productivity. Year-to-year changes in these variables were driven 
principally by natural phenomena, such as weather and mortality, and international events, such 
as relations with colonies and foreign rebellions. Thus, year-to-year changes in these variables 
were largely exogenous to the British economy. 
 
4. Methods 
  This section establishes a framework for analyzing data described in the preceding 
section. The goal is to derive straightforward statistical tests that yield robust results with broad 
implications. The analysis begins with intuition standard among social scientists. Private parties 
desired Parliament to pass acts. Their desires fluctuated as the value of acts fluctuated. Economic 
conditions which altered the costs and benefits of acts propagated those fluctuations. Economists 
summarize such relationships with an inverse demand function. 
(1)  () X q F p d d , =  
In this equation, pd indicates the maximum amount that the public would expend to secure the 
passage of a certain quantity of legislation, qd.  X indicates the array of economic factors that 
influenced the costs and benefits of legislation.  X ={x1, x2, …, xI}, where xi represents the i
th 
factor. To keep the notation clear, assume   ∞ < ∂ ∂ < i x F 0   I i ,..., 1 = ∀ . Since F represents 
demand,  0 < ∂ ∂ q F .  
  The number of acts depended upon the time, effort, and resources that the legislature and 
bureaucracy expended in the approval process as well as factors that influenced legislative 
productivity, such as elections, changes in governments, monarchial mortality, and the need to 
devote time to alternative matters, such as discussing military and international affairs. The  
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number of acts passed also depended upon the lawyers, lobbyists, and peripheral personnel that 
supplicants employed to prepare and advance their petitions as well as the procedures, payoffs, 
and side payments – both in London and the local community – that lubricated lawmaking in 
London. We summarize this complex process with a supply function. 
(2)  () Z q G p s s , =  
ps indicates the costs of passing a quantity of legislation, qs.  Z indicates the array of factors 
influencing the supply of legislation. Symbolically, Z ={z1, z2, …, zJ}, where zi represents the j
th 
factor. To keep the notation clear, assume J j z G j ,..., 1 0 = ∀ > ∂ ∂ . In the short run, 
increasing the quantity of acts required more intensive employment of factors with diminishing 
returns and rising costs. So,  0 ≥ ∂ ∂ q G . 
  The interaction of supply and demand determines the quantity of acts that Parliament 
passes. This equilibrium occurs when the demand price, pd, equals the supply price, ps, plus some 
markup, m. 
 (3)  m p p s d + =  
If the markup exceeds zero, then someone in the act-passing process (either lobbyists, opponents 
of the legislation, or members of Parliament) were able to extract some of the surplus generated 
by the legislation, and the equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the supply and marginal 
revenue curves. If the markup equals zero, then the act-passing process was completely 
competitive, and the equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the demand and supply curves.  
  Substituting Equations (1) and (2) into Equation (3) reveals the number of acts passed in 
equilibrium.  
   (4)  ( ) ( ) m Z q G X q F = −
* * *, *,   
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Here, the asterisk superscript indicates quantities of variables in equilibrium. Rewriting the 
equilibrium condition emphasizes the implicit relationship between the equilibrium values of the 
variables. 
 (5) ( ) ( ) ( ) m Z q G X q F Z X q H = − ≡
* * * * *, *, , *,  
The implicit function theorem describes the relationship between the function, H, the equilibrium 
level of quantity demanded, q*, and the variables that shift supply and demand, X and Z. 
 (6)  ( )
* *, * Z X Q q =  
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  The total differential of (6) provides a linear approximation of the relationship in the 
neighborhood of the equilibrium. 
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This relationship can be estimated with the data described in the preceding section. The change 
in the quantity of acts, Dq*, is the change in the number of acts passed from year t-1 to year t. 
The changes in the independent variables, dxi and dzj, are changes in variables that influence 
demand and supply from year to year. The estimating equation is 






i t z x A ε β α + Δ + Δ = Δ −
=
−





where ΔAt is the change in the number of acts from t-1 to t. Δxi,t-1 is the change in the i
th demand 
shift variable from t-2 to t-1. αi is an estimate of  i x q ∂ ∂ * . Δzj,t-1 is the change in the j
th supply 
shift variable from t-2 to t-1. βj is an estimate of  j z q ∂ ∂ * . εt is an error term.  
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While the series, At, xi,t-1, and zj,t-1, exhibit trends and are non-stationary, the differences 
of those series, ΔAt Δxi,t-1 Δzj,t-1, which enter the estimating equation, are stationary. The error 
term, εt, is auto correlated and heteroskedastic. Because of these characteristics of the residual, 
the Newey-West procedure for estimating a heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix is the appropriate method for calculating the standard errors of our estimates.
10 
  Our estimates of  i x q ∂ ∂ *  and  j z q ∂ ∂ * do not allow us to recover the parameters of the 
underlying supply and demand curves, F and G.  However, our estimates do enable us to 
characterize the shapes of those curves. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate how. 
Proposition 1. If  0 * ≠ ∂ ∂ i x q  for some i, then  ( ) ∞ < ∂ ∂ * * * / , q Z q G .  
 







* * * =





q X q F




   I i ,..., 1 = ∀  because  ( ) q X q F ∂ ∂ / , * *  < 0 and 
() ∞ < ∂ ∂ i x X q F / , * * . 
 
In prose, Proposition 1 indicates that if the quantity of acts fluctuated in response to fluctuations 
of one (or more) of the factors that influenced the demand for acts, then the supply curve for acts 
was not perfectly inelastic. 
Proposition 2. If  0 * ≠ ∂ ∂ j z q  for some j, then  ( ) −∞ > ∂ ∂ * * * / , q X q F .  
 







* * * =





q Z q G




   J j ,..., 1 = ∀   because by definition   () * * * / , q Z q G ∂ ∂  ≥ 
0 and  () ∞ < ∂ ∂ j z Z q G / , * * . 
 
                                                 
10  Whitney K. Newey; Kenneth D. West. “A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.” Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 3. (May, 1987), pp. 703-708. 
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In prose, Proposition 2 states that if the quantity of acts fluctuated in response to fluctuations of 
one (or more) of the factors that influenced the supply for acts, then the demand curve for acts 
was not perfectly inelastic.  
Determining whether αi, our estimate of  i x q ∂ ∂ * , and βj, our estimate of  j z q ∂ ∂ * , differ 
from zero involves hypothesis tests. For the null hypothesis αi = 0, the alterative hypothesis is αi 
≠ 0. For the null hypothesis βj = 0, the alterative hypothesis is βj ≠ 0. The test statistic has a t-
distribution. 
  In addition to being straightforward, our tests have desirable properties. They are 
consistent with almost any plausible structure for the system that produced Parliamentary acts. 
They assume little about the data generating process and remain robust to a wide range of 
statistical complications. They use the data at hand to answer the questions that we posed. Did 
increases in the benefits of reorganizing property rights induce the passage of more estate, 
enclosure, and statutory authority acts? Did Britain’s Parliament accommodate the public’s 
demand to reorganize property-rights and reallocate resources towards more productive uses? 
 
5. Results 
  Table 5 presents results of this exercise for estate acts. Column (1) regresses the year-to-
year change in the annual number of estate acts on year-to-year changes in variables that 
influence the demand for acts: the real interest rate and the volume of trade. The regression spans 
the 124 years for which we have data suitable for statistical analysis. The initial year, 1705, lies 
close to the point where Parliament formalized procedures for processing acts regarding property 
rights. The final year, 1830, lies close to the nationwide reform of Parliamentary elections and 
procedures enshrined in the Great Reform Act of 1832. The regression reveals a correlation 
between changes in the number of acts and changes in the real interest rate. When the interest  
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rate rose and the cost of investing increased, the number of estate acts fell, as our hypothesis 
predicts. The correlation is significant in statistical terms and substantial in magnitude. Column 
(2) adds year-to-year changes in three explanatory variables that influenced the productivity of 
parliament: election years, changes of the prime minister, and the death of a monarch. In this 
specification, as in all others, the coefficient on the real interest rate remains statistically and 
economically significant. Column (3) adds additional explanatory variables, including the year-
to-year changes in the real land tax rate, years where the tax code changed, tree ring growth, 
epidemic mortality, and war years.
11 
Columns (4) through (6) perform the same exercise for a control group: marriage, 
naturalization, and office acts. These non-estate private acts resembled estate acts in many 
dimensions – including typical clientele and procedures for passing parliament – but the value of 
acts in the control group did not depend upon returns from reorganizing property rights. Why do 
we need a control group? It is possible that the regressions in Columns (1) through (3) do not 
control for some unobserved factor correlated with both the real interest rate (our independent 
variable) and with the number of estate acts (our dependent variable). The exclusion of this 
unobserved variable might make it appear as if the real interest rate influenced the demand for 
estate acts, when in actuality, the excluded variable was the source of the correlation. Columns 
(4) through (6) address this issue by indicating whether correlations existed between the 
economic forces that influenced the passage of estate acts and non-estate private acts, for which 
the demand did not depend upon factors that influenced the returns from reorganizing property 
rights. If such correlations existed, then the coefficient on the real interest rate in columns (4) 
                                                 
11   An array of robustness checks that we report in earlier versions of this paper demonstrate that the regressions are 
robust to a wide range of alternative specifications. Neither the signs nor the significance levels of the 
coefficients change when the endpoints of the analysis change by up to two decades. The signs and significance 
levels are also invariant to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables such as year-to-year changes in the 
level of population, industrial production, Parliamentary majorities, and military conflicts.  
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through (6) would be statistically and substantively significant. The coefficients are, however, 
insignificant, indicating that excluded variables that influenced private acts’ passage through 
Parliament did not drive the results of specifications (1) through (3).  
Columns (7) and (8) reinforce this result. Column (7) employs non-estate private acts as 
an explanatory variable. Column (8) employs the residual from a regression of all non-estate 
private acts on the explanatory variables in columns (4) through (6). The results of these 
regressions indicate that non-estate private acts were correlated neither with the real interest rate 
nor with acts that reorganized property rights. These results can be restated. In our analysis, 
interest rates affected the treatment group but not the control group. 
Table 6 replicates these results for the years 1763 to 1830, which span the generations 
during which the Industrial Revolution began, spread, and accelerated. The years also span the 
period for which all acts are accurately dated and other statistical series pose the fewest 
problems. Columns (1) through (3) and (6) through (10) demonstrate that the results of Table 1 
hold for this key period and for the cleanest data. Column (4) shows that these results hold when 
the dependent variable is limited to acts that authorized sales of strictly-settled land. Column (5) 
shows that these results hold when the dependent variable is limited to acts that authorized the 
lease of strictly-settled lands. Overall, Tables 5 and 6 indicate that changes in the interest rate 
coincided with changes in the number of acts authorizing the sale, lease, and reorganization of 
land. 
Table 7 presents the results of this exercise for statutory authorities. Column (1) regresses 
the change in the number of statutory authority acts on the variables that influence the demand: 
the change in the real interest rate and the change in the level of trade. Column (2) adds to the 
regression variables that shift the supply curve including years of elections, changes in the prime  
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minister (and thus, the coalition controlling Parliament), and the death of the monarch. Column 
(3) adds to the regression a vector of control variables including changes in climate (derived 
from tree-ring data), changes in the disease environment (as measured by the onset and end of 
epidemics), and changes in the real value of the land tax. Column (4) regresses the same 
variables for the years 1763 to 1830, for which the dating of acts poses no problems. Column (5) 
regresses changes in the number of transportation acts on the full spectrum of independent 
variables introduced in the previous column. Column (6) regresses changes in the number of acts 
pertaining to urban services and infrastructure on the full spectrum of independent variables. 
  The results reveals a strong statistical correlation between economic conditions that 
influenced the value of statutory authorities and the number of statutory authorities passed by 
Parliament. The magnitude of the coefficients on our demand shift variables averages a little less 
than -1.0 for the change in the real interest rate and a little below 1.0 for the change in trade. The 
standard errors on those variables average about 0.30 and 0.28 respectively. The small size of the 
standard errors relative to the magnitudes indicates that the coefficients are measured precisely. 
The null hypothesis that the coefficients equal zero is rejected at the 1% significance level. This 
result holds for all specifications, including numerous permutations which we examined to 
determine the robustness of our result, but which to save space, have not included in this essay.
12  
  How responsive was Parliament to changes in the demand for acts reorganizing rights? A 
few calculations reveal the answer to this inquiry. The standard deviation of the change in the 
                                                 
12   The regressions are robust to a wide range of alternative specifications which to save space, we have not 
included in this essay. Neither the signs nor the significance levels of the coefficients change when the endpoints 
of the analysis change by a decade or more. Regressions employing data only for the period for which we can 
date acts precisely (1764 to 1830) yield coefficients nearly identical to those for the full sample. The estimates 
are also unaffected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. When the change in industrial 
production appears as an explanatory variable, the results remain the same, and industrial production is 
insignificant, unless trade is excluded. In the latter case, the coefficient on industrial production becomes 
statistically and substantively significant and explains about as much of the variation in the dependent variable as 
had trade. Adding indictors for the onset and cessation of military hostilities does not alter the results. Interacting 
years of military conflict with the principal explanatory variables strengthens the results.  
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real interest rate is 4.90. The average of coefficient on the real interest rate in columns (1) 
through (3) is -1.03. Multiplying those numbers indicates that a one standard deviation decline in 
the real interest rate coincided with an increase of 5.03 in the number of statutory authority acts. 
The standard deviation of the change in the number of statutory authority acts is 16.84. Thus, a 
one standard deviation decline in interest rates explains approximately 30% (~5.03/16.84) of a 
standard deviation change in the number of statutory authority acts. Similarly, the standard 
deviation of the change in trade is 4.66. The average of coefficient on trade in columns (1) 
through (3) is 0.99. The product of those numbers is 4.61. Thus, a one standard deviation change 
in the volume of trade explains 27% of a standard deviation change in the number of statutory 
authority acts. In total, the two demand-shift variables in the regressions explain more than half 
of the variation in the number of statutory authority acts. Parliamentary accommodation of the 
public’s demands, in other words, explains the majority of the annual fluctuation in statutory 
authority acts. 
  Columns (4) and (5) indicate that this finding holds for subcategories of statutory 
authorities associated with the modernization of the English economy: transportation 
improvements and urban expansion. Multiplying the standard deviation of the real rate with the 
coefficient in Column (4) and dividing by the standard deviation of transportation acts (11.9) 
indicates that fluctuations in the real rate explain 24% of the fluctuation in transportation acts. 
Similar calculations indicate that fluctuations in the real rate explain 21% of the fluctuation in 
acts for improving infrastructure and public services in urban communities. Fluctuations in trade 
explain 21% of the variation in transportation acts and 23% of the variation in urban acts. 
  Political variables also have substantial correlations with the number of statutory 
authorities passed by Parliament. The number of acts fell during election years and during years  
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in which monarchs died and rebounded one year later. Together, these perturbations in the 
political process explain a little more than one quarter of the variation in statutory authorities. 
  Columns (7) and (8) examine a control group: changes in the number of government 
finance acts. The control group is uncorrelated with changes in interest rates and changes in the 
volume of trade. Adding the control group as an explanatory variable alters neither the signs nor 
the magnitudes of the other explanatory variables. 
  Table 8 examines enclosure acts. Columns (1) through (3) show the number of enclosures 
increased when interest rates fell. The number of enclosures fell when interest rates rose. This 
result reinforces the decades-old observation of the inverse correlation between interest rates and 
enclosures. We show that this relationship exists even after controlling for confounding variables 
and autocorrelation. Column (4) shows that there is no correlation between enclosure 
amendments and interest rates, which suggests that the variation in the number of enclosure acts 
was not driven by changes in unobserved factors correlated with our explanatory variables (i.e. 
factors that altered the costs or benefits of creating acts).  
  Together, Tables 5 through 8 illuminate several important patterns. First, the equilibrium 
number of acts reorganizing property rights changed in response to changes in the interest rate 
and volume of trade, two of the principal factors influencing the returns from reorganizing 
property rights. Proposition 1 reveals how to interpret this result. The supply curve for acts of 
Parliament sloped upwards, but was not vertical. The political process, in other words, responded 
flexibly to demands to reorganize property rights. When the public requested more acts, 
Parliament passed more acts. When the public requested fewer acts, Parliament passed fewer 
acts. Second, the equilibrium number of acts reorganizing property rights also changed in 
response to changes in the productivity of Parliament, as measured by factors that shifted the  
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length of time that Parliament sat in session and legislators’ incentives for passing local 
legislation. Proposition 2 reveals how to interpret this result. The demand curve for acts of 
Parliament sloped downwards. When economic conditions increased (or decreased) returns from 
reorganizing property rights, the number of acts that the public desired increased (or decreased). 
  In sum, as the economy evolved, the public desired to adopt property-rights arrangements 
that enabled them to reallocate resources towards more productive uses. Parliament 
accommodated those desires.  
  
6. Discussion 
At the opening of the eighteenth century, Parliament established a forum for reorganizing 
rights to land and resources. This venue enabled individuals, families, and communities to 
exploit opportunities that could not be accommodated by the inflexible rights regime inherited 
from England’s past. During the next two centuries, Britain experienced agricultural and 
industrial revolutions. The timing suggests a connection between Parliament’s revolutionary 
approach to property rights and the economic events that followed. Evidence from an array of 
sources indicates that Parliament’s actions did, in fact, foster economic development.  
Estate acts – particularly those authorizing the sale and lease of land – exposed land to 
the invisible hand. Freeing resources from the shackles of the past loosened constraints on 
landowners, facilitated the reallocation of physical and financial assets to new and lucrative uses, 
and enabled the exploitation of opportunities arising in a dynamic economy. The lowering of 
transaction costs enhanced efficiency and encouraged investment. The lowering of such barriers 
has long been considered a principal force propelling European economic progress (North, 
1981).  
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The benefits of estate acts extended beyond the persons and property involved. Estate 
acts established precedents. Knowledge of what Parliament would decide when confronted with 
a case helped to resolve disputes within families, to safeguard the interests of investors, to 
determine the distribution of rents within ongoing business arrangements, and to prevent the 
holding-up of new projects by those seeking an inordinate share of the profits. The development 
of institutions solving such problems has long been considered to be one of the principal 
institutional innovations underlying modern capitalist economies (Williamson, 1985). 
Statutory authorities played a large role in two transcendent developments: urbanization 
and commercialization. In rapidly expanding urban areas, statutory authorities provided fresh 
water, removed garbage, aided the indigent, operated forums for dispute resolution, and financed 
police forces. Large numbers of people living in small areas required these services. For 
domestic and international commerce, statutory authorities established the high-volume, long-
distance transportation network. Turnpike trusts reduced freight charges and travel times by 
widening, resurfacing, and maintaining thoroughfares (Bogart, 2005). Canal companies enabled 
coal to reach emerging manufacturing centers, such as Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and 
Leeds. Harbor-improvement authorities increased the number and draft of ships which could 
dock in port, facilitating the expansion of maritime commerce.  
Statutory authorities of all types played a pivotal role in the accumulation of capital. In 
1810, for example, the value of capital raised by statutory authorities for canals, rivers, turnpikes, 
water works, docks, and gas lighting equaled 41 million pounds, or nearly 6.5% of the total 
capital stock (Harris 2000, p. 195). 
Enclosures have been studied by numerous scholars. Many consider enclosures a catalyst 
for increasing agricultural productivity (Richardson, 2001). Enclosures enabled farmers to  
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introduce new crops, improve livestock, reduce overuse of common resources, and react to 
market opportunities. Robert Allen (1992) and Gregory Clark (1998) find these factors’ impact 
on the productivity of arable land to be positive, but limited. Enclosure acts had additional 
effects. Enclosures authorized the recovery of wastelands, the drainage of fens, and the 
construction of irrigation channels. Enclosures also transferred agricultural land to urban and 
industrial uses, particularly near expanding towns and cities. 
Britain’s system for reorganizing property rights was unique among European nations. In 
other nations, the transition from medieval to modern landholding systems involved spasms of 
reform and rebellion. In France after 1789 and Russia after 1917, for example, revolutionaries 
annulled laws binding land and labor to traditional tasks; voided privileges possessed by nobles, 
clergy, and corporations; redistributed political power; and restructured anachronistic property-
rights regimes.  
Before these revolutions, inflexible property-rights regimes prevented entrepreneurs from 
exploiting emerging opportunities. In France, for example, the sclerotic landholding system 
impeded the construction of infrastructure, such as canals, even when returns from their 
operation would have substantially exceeded construction costs (Rosenthal, 1992). The principal 
problem involved establishing rights of way. Local groups who opposed projects (or hoped for a 
larger share of the profits) could perpetually delay construction by repeatedly suing in slow and 
inefficient courts. Only after its revolution did France simplify procedures for establishing rights 
of way.
13 
Britain established procedures for establishing rights of way more than a century before 
France and other countries on the continent. Britain created these procedures at the same time 
                                                 
13   Evidence also indicates that during the eighteenth century, French cultivation continued as it had in the Middle 
Ages. In England, however, “agriculture entered a dynamic period of rapid and far reaching change (Sexauer 
1976).”  
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that Parliament established procedures for passing estate, statutory authority, and enclosure acts. 
Why did Parliament act at that time? The proximate answer is the Glorious Revolution of 1688, 
after which Britain became a constitutional monarchy, and the political system changed in 
fundamental ways. 
Parliamentary supremacy triggered transcendent political and intellectual developments. 
The Bill of Rights in 1689 (and subsequent legislation) encouraged the expansion of legislative 
activity. Parliament began meeting on a predictable, annual schedule. Parliament began setting 
its own agenda. Parliament established a permanent bureaucracy and procedures for processing 
petitions. Streamlined procedures reduced the cost of submitting bills and increased the 
predictability of passage. A cadre of professional solicitors and clerks emerged to help petitions 
through the Parliamentary process. By the 1720s, capacity expanded to the point where the 
legislative process could effectively accommodate almost any demand for legislation 
reorganizing property rights. 
The political system that solidified at that time internalized a balance of political power 
between landowning, mercantile, courtly, and aristocratic interests. That balance enabled 
individuals interested in economic development to pass acts restructuring property rights and 
promoting economic progress. Political stability ensured that those acts would not be overturned 
by the ascension of new regimes, via either violent revolution or Parliamentary election. 
Parliament’s decisions became the law of the land. 
The security of property rights was not absolute. Parliament felt free to alter rights 
regarding resources that could be put to more productive uses. Parliament did not, however, 
expropriate rights to resources without compensation. Our research indicates that individuals 
often received remuneration for the rights that they lost. Remuneration typically left all parties as  
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well off as before. Parliament, in other words, provided security for income derived from rights 
to property, but not security for the rights themselves. Rights typically defined who could use a 
piece of property, what they could employ the property for, when they could employ the 
property, and who would share in the resulting benefits. These rights were pliable. These rights 
could be altered by common consent and political decisions. This flexibility of rights enabled 
society’s institutional foundations to adapt to new conditions and emerging opportunities.   
This notion of security differs from the type of security discussed by North and Weingast 
(1989), which referred to protection from arbitrary royal expropriation.
14 The difference between 
their ideas and our ideas stems from differences in opinion over the relative importance of 
clauses in the British Bill of Rights. North and Weingast emphasize the Bill of Right’s initial 
affirmative clause, which prohibited the monarch from interfering with the operations of the 
legislature and judiciary, and which was a direct refutation of the reign of King Charles II. This 
clause, however, reiterated similar clauses that appeared in the Magna Carta of 1215; in a 
multitude of subsequent corroborating charters, confirmation, and statutes, passed during the 
reigns of King Henry III through Elizabeth I; and the Petition of Right, a parliamentary 
declaration in 1628 of the liberties of the people, assented to by King Charles I. We emphasize 
clauses in the Bill of Rights that were new additions to the English constitutional lexicon. These 
clauses enabled Parliament to sit in session for prolonged periods each year, to determine what 
bills to consider during each session, and to set its own agenda. These clauses guaranteed 
freedom of speech within Parliament and allowed opposition politicians in exile to return home. 
These returnees brought with them new ideas about property and government. These changes in 
                                                 
14   Like many economists, we believe that security from arbitrary expropriation is a prerequisite for progress. But, 
like most historians of early-modern Britain, we believe that such security existed in England long before the 
Glorious Revolution, which reestablished a status-quo that had existed before the Stuart’s attempted to impose 
an absolute monarchy on their united kingdoms.  
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the political system enabled Parliament to contemplate complex issues concerning property 
rights and to establish a system that protected rights to income, which minimized opposition to 
the reorganization of rights, and a system that encouraged institutional adaptability, which 
facilitated the reallocation of resources to new and more productive uses. 
The seminal studies of Ronald Coase (1960, 1974) illuminate the importance of Britain’s 
adaptable property-rights regime. Coase argues that in the presence of transaction costs, attaining 
economic efficiency requires the proper definition and allocation of property rights. In “The 
Problem of Social Cost (1960)” Coase argues that nineteenth-century British common and 
statutory law recognized these principles, and that Britain’s courts and Parliament reallocated 
property rights to encourage economic efficiency. In “The Lighthouse in Economics,” Coase 
(1974) argues that in the nineteenth century, Parliament’s creation of statutory authorities 
encouraged the provision of public goods and services. Coase illuminates his assertion with an 
example. Parliament assigned ‘lighthouse rights’ to certain plots of land. Lighthouse rights 
allowed anyone operating a lighthouse to collect tolls from passing vessels. The customs service 
collected these tolls when merchants submitted customs forms, which indicated their port of 
origin and arrival, and thus all of the lighthouses that they passed along the way. These new 
lighthouse rights superseded ancient rights enshrined guaranteeing merchants transit free from 
tax or toll. Our research suggests that Parliament began to operate in the way that Coase 
described in the early eighteenth century, following the Glorious Revolution, when Parliament 
gained control of government and political enlightenment reached England.
15 
                                                 
15   Previous scholars emphasized the first half of Coase’s essay, “The Problem of Social Costs (1960),” which 
models a world without transaction costs in which any assignment of secure property rights results in an efficient 
outcome. We emphasize the second section of Coase’s essay, which models a world with transaction costs. In 
such a world, some distribution of property rights lead to efficient outcomes, while others trap people in poverty. 
The market alone may not alleviate this affliction. Some institution, such as Parliament, must lower transaction 
costs and/or reassign rights in order for efficiency to arise.  
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Puzzles remain concerning the causes and consequences of the property rights revolution 
in Britain. One puzzle concerns redistribution. Changing property rights increased some group’s 
incomes, but potentially lowered the incomes of others. Vested interests that could be harmed 
would naturally lobby against legislation. Acts reorganizing property rights, however, often 
passed without opposition and with the support of all concerned. Why? Parliament appears to 
have overcome opposition by establishing mechanisms for ensuring that all pertinent parties 
benefited from the legislation. Parliament, in other words, ensured that legislation contained 
side-payments sufficient to satisfy vested interests.  
A second puzzle concerns the effort which members of Parliament put into designing and 
passing estate, enclosure, and statutory authority acts. Parliament spent on acts affecting specific 
individuals and communities as much time and energy, if not more, than Parliament did on acts 
concerning war, taxation, trade, and colonies. Why did Parliament devote so much effort to 
issues affecting localities and individuals? A possible explanation is that members of Parliament 
devoted themselves to passing such legislation because it increased their chances of reelection 
and their personal incomes. Localities supported members of Parliament who advanced local 
interests. Competition for seats in Parliament, therefore, may have been a key factor underlying 
political support for institutional adaptability. 
A third puzzle concerns the connection between the property-rights revolution and an 
intellectual revolution occurring at that time: the Enlightenment. The essence of the 
Enlightenment was the notion that natural laws could be identified and harnessed for the 
betterment of society (Mokyr 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). The reform of parliamentary process 
in the early eighteenth century coincided with the rise of prominent enlightened English thinkers 
including John Locke. In December 1689, Locke published his magnum opus, Two Treatise of  
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Government. The second treatise focused on the concepts of property and legislature. Locke 
wrote that property should be used industriously and rationally. Rights to property formed the 
foundation for civil society. These rights existed by consent of the citizenry. That consent formed 
the law of the land (Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Chapter V, On Property, Sections 
34 and 35). Locke’s concepts of property rights, civil government, and consent of the governed 
informed the individuals who reformed Britain’s political system in the late-seventeenth and 
early-eighteenth century. These reforms allowed all citizens (not just the King and his 
appointees) to utilize forms of petitions previously employed for the reorganization of royal 
estates, appointments to royal offices, and the assignment of rights to aristocratic estates and 
chartered towns. The principal modification of the old form was the addition of clauses 
indicating that the acts would enhance the wealth of the realm and enable individuals and 
communities to prosper. These clauses provide textual evidence that Enlightenment ideals 
influenced estate, enclosure, and statutory authority acts. 
What are the broader lessons from Britain’s property rights revolution? Adaptable 
property-rights may be as important as secure property-rights. Both may be necessary for 
economic development. The pair may be sufficient to trigger modern economic growth. One way 
to create adaptable property-rights is to establish political procedures that generate consent for 
change and ensure that vested interests do not oppose development. Piecemeal actions that 
address specific problems facing individuals and communities may be easier to implement than 
widespread reforms that addresses general problems. Overtime, a piecemeal process may reveal 
general patterns that could serve as the foundation for nationwide reforms. The Parliamentary 
procedures that triggered the property-rights revolution in Britain (and which remain embedded  
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within Anglo-Saxon legal systems today) may have useful applications in modern developing 
nations.  
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Table 1: Estate and Other Private Acts, Summary Statistics 
   Δ Rights  Series in levels  Series in differences 
   Land Personal  Avg SD Min Max  Avg SD Min Max  
    Type of Acts  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)   
 
 
Estate  Acts                         
(a) All  Estates  All  Some   22.7 11.1  0  66    0.2 13.0 -55  65 
(b)  Estates that authorizes sales  All  Some    11.1  6.3  0  33    0.1  7.2  -33  30 
(c)  Estates that authorizes leases  All  Some    3.3  2.9  0  22    0.4  3.0  -11  15 




Non-Estate Private Acts 
                
(e) Marriage  No  All    1.6  2.0  0  10    0.1  2.2  -9  7 
(f) Naturalization  No  All    7.2  6.3  0  36   0.0  7.2  -29  22 
(g) Office  No  All    0.4  0.9  0  7    0.0  1.2  -6  7 
(h)  Sum (Marriage, Naturalization, Office)  No  All    9.1  7.6  0  46    0.1  8.7  -34  25 
                                           
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “yes” for acts that did and “no” for 
acts that did not. Column (2) indicates acts that altered personal rights, marked “yes” for acts that did, and “some” if the 
act sometimes affected personal rights. Columns (3) through (6) describe the statistical properties of the original series. 
Columns (7) through (10) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in year 
t-1 is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (7) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (8) indicate 
the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (9) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (10) indicate the maximum 
value.  
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Table 2: Statutory Authority and Finance Acts, Summary Statistics 
 
        Series in levels  Series in differences 
    Δ Rights 
To Land 
Provide 
I & S  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat?  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat? 
       (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   
Statutory Authority Acts                   
(a) All  All  All  46.1  42  0  187  No    0.9 15.9 -53  45  Yes 
(b) Transportation  Only  All  All  33.7 29.8  0  126  No    0.8  11.3 -37  32  Yes 
(c)  Urban  Only  All  All  9 10.5 0  53 Yes    0.1 6.6 -22 26 Yes 
   
Comparison Group                   
(d) Finance  Acts  None  Some  22.7 22.3  0  94  Yes    0.2  15.8 -87  54  Yes 
                                          
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “All” for acts that did and 
“none” for acts that did not. Column (2) indicates whether the acts authorized the provision of infrastructure or 
services, marked “All” for acts that did and “some” for categories in which some acts authorized infrastructure 
and services. Columns (3) through (7) describe the statistical properties of the original series. Columns (8) 
through (12) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in year t-1 
is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (8) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (9) 
indicate the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (10) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (11) 
indicate the maximum value. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series is stationary, indicated “yes,” or 
whether the series is non-stationary, indicated “no.” An augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine 
whether the series possesses a unit root. 
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Table 3: Enclosure Acts and Amendments, Summary Statistics 
 
        Series in levels  Series in differences 
    Δ Rights  
To Land 
Correct 
Error  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat?  Avg  SD  Min Max Stat? 
       (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                     
(a)  Enclosure  Acts  All  None 27.4  35.7 0 135 No   0.6  12.7  -50 37 Yes 
(b)  Enclosure  Amendments  Some  All  0.2  0.7 0  5 Yes   0 0.7  -3 5 Yes 
                                          
 
Notes: Column (1) indicates acts that changed rights to land and resources, marked “all” for acts that did and “some” 
for categories in which some acts changed rights to land and resources while other acts did not. Column (2) indicates 
whether the acts amended or corrected earlier acts changing rights to land and resources, marked “all” for acts that 
did and “none” for acts that did not. Columns (3) through (7) describe the statistical properties of the original series. 
Columns (8) through (12) describe the statistical properties of the series in differences, i.e. where the observation in 
year t-1 is subtracted from the observation in year t. Columns (3) and (8) indicate the average. Columns (4) and (9) 
indicate the standard deviation. Columns (5) and (10) indicate the minimum value. Columns (6) and (11) indicate the 
maximum value. Columns (7) and (12) indicate whether the series is stationary, indicated “yes,” or whether the series 
is non-stationary, indicated “no.” An augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to determine whether the series possesses 
a unit root. 
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Table 4: Economic and Political Explanatory Variables, Summary Statistics 
 
      Series in Differences       
     Avg  SD  Min Max  Description  Sources 
        (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
                  
(a)  Interest Rate, Real    -0.1  4.9  -15.1  12.9    Yield on 2½ % consols minus inflation.  Neal (1990) and Clark (2001) 
(b)  Foreign Trade, Volume    0.7  4.5  -24.2  18.3    Sum exports plus imports at official prices.  Mitchell (1988) 
                  
(c)  Election Year    0  0.6  -1  1    Indicator for years with elections.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(d)  Monarch Dies    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years in which monarch dies.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(e)  Prime Minister Changes    0  0.5  -1  1    Indicator for years in which PM changes.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
                  
(f)  Epidemic Mortality    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years with epidemic mortality.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(g)  Land Tax Rate, Real    0  0.6  -2  4    Tax rate in shillings per acre.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(h)  Tax Code Change    0  0.1  -1  1    Indicator for year when tax code changes.  H.HS (1993)  and Evans (2001) 
(i)  Tree  Ring  Growth    3.3 178.5  -468  496  Index.  0 equals no growth. 1000 is average.  Baillie (1986) 
(j)  War Years    0  0.3  -1  1    Indicator for years when Britain fights wars.  Rodger (2004), H.HS (1993), 
and Evans (2001) 
                         
 
Notes: Definitions for Columns (1) through (4) identical to definitions for Columns (8) through (11) in Table 3. All of these 




Table 5: Estate Acts, 1705-1830, Regression Results 
   Δ Estate Acts  Δ Non-Estate Private Acts  Δ Estate Acts 









Leases  Variable 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Δ Real interest rate  -0.24 -0.26 -0.26  -0.03 -0.16  0.01  -0.24 -0.26 
   [0.09]  [0.10]  [0.09  [0.05]  [0.18]  [0.01]  [0.10]  [0.10] 
                 
Δ Trade    -0.07  -0.13  -0.01  0.03  0.02  0.02  -0.13 -0.13 
   [0.08]  [0.10]  [0.09]  [0.03]  [0.12]  [0.01]  [0.09]  [0.09] 
                  
Δ Election      -0.49  -0.46  -0.58  -1.01  0.06  -0.29  -0.46 
     [1.85]  [2.03]  [0.44]  [1.16]  [0.12]  [2.03]  [2.03] 
                  
Δ New Prime Minister    -1.09  -1.16  0.76  1.30 0.37 -1.34 -1.16 
     [1.25]  [1.30]  [0.39]  [1.22]  [0.30]  [1.27]  [1.34] 
                  
Δ Monarch Dies      -1.86  -1.92  -0.82  2.65 0.85 -2.01 -1.92 
     [2.03]  [2.31]  [0.46]  [1.90]  [0.55]  [2.20]  [2.20] 
                  
Δ Non-Estate Private Acts            0.09   
               [0.07]   
                  
Residuals from Estimated Δ Non-Estate Private Acts          0.09 
                 [0.07] 
                  
Additional Controls ?  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                  
# Observations    124  124  124  124  124  124  124  124 
F-test (deg. freedom)    (2,113)  (5,110)  (9,105)  (9,105)  (9,105)  (9,105)  (10,104)  (10,104) 
F-test statistic    478  2114  372  44  21  518  859  341 
 
Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard  
errors calculated using the Newey-West procedure with 9 lags.   
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Table 6: Estate Acts, 1765-1830, Regression Results 
 
   Δ Estate Acts  Δ Non-Estate Private Acts  Δ Estate Acts 









Leases  Variable 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
                 
Δ Real interest rate  -0.33 -0.38 -0.37  -0.17 -0.21  -0.10 -0.29  -0.00  -0.37 -0.38 
   [0.09] [0.09]  [.08]  [0.08] [0.11]  [0.08]  [0.25] [0.01]  [0.09] [0.09] 
                 
Δ Trade    -0.06  -0.15  -0.15 -0.02  -0.13  0.04 0.03  0.01 -0.16  -0.15 
   [0.08] [0.09]  [.09]  [0.08] [0.05]  [0.04]  [0.12] [0.01]  [0.09] [0.09] 
                 
Δ  Election     -2.92 -2.85  -1.89 -1.03  -0.97  -0.17 -0.10  -2.84 -2.92 
     [1.82] [1.91]  [1.39] [0.73]  [0.64]  [1.94] [0.09]  [1.79] [1.85] 
                 
Δ New Prime Minister    -2.27 -2.33  -1.55  -0.73  -1.55  1.67 0.49  -2.38 -2.27 
     [0.90] [1.04]  [0.97] [0.50]  [0.56]  [1.80] [0.32]  [0.90] [0.94] 
                 
Δ Monarch Dies      3.01 3.43  3.20  -0.19 -0.32  3.99  0.27 2.87  3.01 
     [1.76] [1.99]  [0.95] [1.13]  [0.68]  [1.80] [0.16]  [1.64] [1.77] 
                 
Δ Non-Estate Private Acts                0.03   
              [ 0 . 0 5 ]   
                 
Residuals from Estimated Δ Non-Estate Private Acts            0.03 
                 [ 0 . 0 5 ]  
                 
Additional  Controls?  No No  Yes  No No  No  No No  No No 
                 
#  Observations   66 66 66  66 66  66  66 66  66 66 
F-test  (deg.  freedom)   (2,64) (5,61) (8,58)  (5,61) (5,61)  (5,61)  (5,61) (5,61)  (6,60) (6,60) 
F-test  statistic    6 84.15  8.34  24.2 24.15  11.28  0.02  0.71  21.73 21.73 
 
Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated using the 
Newey-West procedure with 9 lags.  
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Table 7:  Statutory Authority Acts, Regression Result 
 
   Δ Statutory Authorities    Δ Finance 
 All All All All  Transport Urban  All      Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) 
              
Δ Real interest rate    -0.988 -1.019 -1.075  -1.13 -0.588 -0.302 -0.861   -0.040 
   [0.307] [0.295] [0.305]  [.56] [0.195] [0.139] [0.229]   [0.308] 
             
Δ Trade    1.015 0.995 0.959 0.967 0.531 0.341 0.795   0.578 
   [0.313] [0.262] [0.266]  [.295] [0.2549 [0.087] [0.332]   [0.768] 
             
Δ Election      -6.658 -6.688 -8.931 -5.323 -0.661  -5.749   -1.827 
     [2.457] [2.460] [4.328] [1.662] [1.065] [2.290]   [2.370] 
             
Δ  New  Prime  Minister     4.476 4.305 6.880 4.303  0.550 4.728   3.229 
     [3.157] [3.299] [5.091] [2.361] [1.156] [3.775]   [3.264] 
             
Δ Monarch Dies      -5.196 -5.590 -9.871 -2.214 -2.908  -6.145   0.026 
     [2.662] [2.679] [6.488] [1.969] [1.706] [3.415]   [3.790] 
              
Δ  Finance  acts          0.173   
           [ 0 . 1 5 8 ]    
              
Additional  Controls?    No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
            
#  Observations   124 124 124  66 124 124 119   119 
F-test (deg freedom)    (2,121)  (5,118)  (8, 115)  (8,58)  (8, 115)  (8, 115)  (9,110)    (8, 110) 
F-test  statistic   9.23 5.78 3.67  22.67 3.73 4.06 3.62   0.99 
 
Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated 
using the Newey-West procedure with 9 lags. 
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Bold face indicates significant at the 5% level. Italic indicates 
significance at the 10% level. Standard errors calculated using the 
Newey-West procedure with 9 lags.
Δ Enclosure 
Acts 
  Δ Enclosure 
Amendments Variable 
(1) (2)  (3)    (4) 
          
Δ Real interest rate  - 0.99  -0.51  -0.53    0.04 
 [0.17]  [0.30]  [0.31]    [0.03] 
          
Δ Trade  0.50  0.57  0.59    -0.06 
 [0.34]  [0.39]  [0.40]    [0.02] 
          
Δ Election    -5.51  -5.57   0.20 
   [2.89]  [2.95]    [.45] 
          
Δ New Prime Minister  3.17 3.12    0.15 
   [3.55]  [3.60]    [0.24] 
          
Δ Land Tax Rate    -12.77 -12.63   -0.45 
   [6.88]  [7.02]    [0.56] 
          
Δ Tax Code   -16.18  -15.54    -2.06 
   [4.72]  [4.97]    [0.27] 
          
Δ Enclosure Amendments    0.31     
     [0.76]     
          
Additional Controls?  No  Yes  Yes    Yes 
          
# Observations  66  66  66    66 
F-test (deg freedom)  (2,64)  (10,56)  (11,55)    (10,56) 
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